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         Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions
 
 Abstract
 
    This document specifies authorization extensions to the Transport
    Layer Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol.  Extensions are carried in
    the client and server hello messages to confirm that both parties
    support the desired authorization data types.  Then, if supported by
    both the client and the server, authorization information, such as
    attribute certificates (ACs) or Security Assertion Markup Language
    (SAML) assertions, is exchanged in the supplemental data handshake
    message.
 
 Status of This Memo
 
    This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
    published for examination, experimental implementation, and
    evaluation.
 
    This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
    community.  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF
    community.  It has received public review and has been approved for
    publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not
    all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of
    Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 
    Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
    http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5878.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
    Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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    to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
    include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
    the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
    described in the Simplified BSD License.
 
 1.  Introduction
 
    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol ([TLS1.0], [TLS1.1],
    [TLS1.2]) is being used in an increasing variety of operational
    environments, including ones that were not envisioned at the time of
    the original design for TLS.  The extensions introduced in this
    document are designed to enable TLS to operate in environments where
    authorization information needs to be exchanged between the client
    and the server before any protected data is exchanged.  The use of
    these TLS authorization extensions is especially attractive when more
    than one application protocol can make use of the same authorization
    information.
 
    The format and content of the authorization information carried in
    these extensions are extensible.  This document references Security
    Assertion Markup Language (SAML) assertion ([SAML1.1], [SAML2.0]) and
    X.509 attribute certificate (AC) [ATTRCERT] authorization formats,
    but other formats can be used.  Future authorization extensions may
    include any opaque assertion that is digitally signed by a trusted
    issuer.  Recognizing the similarity to certification path validation,
    this document recommends the use of TLS Alert messages related to
    certificate processing to report authorization information processing
    failures.
 
    Straightforward binding of identification, authentication, and
    authorization information to an encrypted session is possible when
    all of these are handled within TLS.  If each application requires
    unique authorization information, then it might best be carried
    within the TLS-protected application protocol.  However, care must be
    taken to ensure appropriate bindings when identification,
    authentication, and authorization information are handled at
    different protocol layers.
 
    This document describes authorization extensions for the TLS
    Handshake Protocol in TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2.  These
    extensions observe the conventions defined for TLS extensions that
    were originally defined in [TLSEXT1] and revised in [TLSEXT2]; TLS
    extensions are now part of TLS 1.2 [TLS1.2].  TLS extensions use
    general extension mechanisms for the client hello message and the
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    server hello message.  The extensions described in this document
    confirm that both the client and the server support the desired
    authorization data types.  Then, if supported, authorization
    information is exchanged in the supplemental data handshake message
    [TLSSUPP].
 
    The authorization extensions may be used in conjunction with TLS 1.0,
    TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2.  The extensions are designed to be backwards
    compatible, meaning that the handshake protocol supplemental data
    messages will only contain authorization information of a particular
    type if the client indicates support for them in the client hello
    message and the server indicates support for them in the server hello
    message.
 
    Clients typically know the context of the TLS session that is being
    set up; thus, the client can use the authorization extensions when
    they are needed.  Servers must accept extended client hello messages,
    even if the server does not "understand" all of the listed
    extensions.  However, the server will not indicate support for these
    "not understood" extensions.  Then, clients may reject communications
    with servers that do not support the authorization extensions.
 
 1.1.  Conventions
 
    The syntax for the authorization messages is defined using the TLS
    Presentation Language, which is specified in Section 4 of [TLS1.0].
 
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [STDWORDS].
 
 1.2.  Overview
 
    Figure 1 illustrates the placement of the authorization extensions
    and supplemental data messages in the full TLS handshake.
 
    The ClientHello message includes an indication of the client
    authorization data formats that are supported and an indication of
    the server authorization data formats that are supported.  The
    ServerHello message contains similar indications, but any
    authorization data formats that are not supported by the server are
    not included.  Both the client and the server MUST indicate support
    for the authorization data types.  If the list of mutually supported
    authorization data formats is empty, then the ServerHello message
    MUST NOT carry the affected extension at all.
 
    Successful session resumption uses the same authorization information
    as the original session.
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     Client                                                   Server
 
     ClientHello (w/ extensions) -------->
 
                                         ServerHello (w/ extensions)
                                                   SupplementalData*
                                                        Certificate*
                                                  ServerKeyExchange*
                                                 CertificateRequest*
                                 <--------           ServerHelloDone
     SupplementalData*
     Certificate*
     ClientKeyExchange
     CertificateVerify*
     [ChangeCipherSpec]
     Finished                    -------->
                                                  [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                 <--------                  Finished
     Application Data            <------->          Application Data
 
      *  Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that
         are not always sent.
 
      [] Indicates that ChangeCipherSpec is an independent TLS
         protocol content type; it is not actually a TLS
         handshake message.
 
        Figure 1.  Authorization Data Exchange in Full TLS Handshake
 
 2.  Authorization Extension Types
 
    The general extension mechanisms enable clients and servers to
    negotiate whether to use specific extensions, and how to use specific
    extensions.  As specified in [TLS1.2], the extension format used in
    the extended client hello message and extended server hello message
    is repeated here for convenience:
 
       struct {
          ExtensionType extension_type;
          opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
       } Extension;
 
    The extension_type identifies a particular extension type, and the
    extension_data contains information specific to the particular
    extension type.  This document specifies the use of two new extension
    types: client_authz and server_authz.  These extension types are
    described in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, respectively.  This
    specification adds two new types to ExtensionType:
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       enum {
         client_authz(7), server_authz(8), (65535)
       } ExtensionType;
 
    The authorization extensions are relevant when a session is initiated
    and on any subsequent session resumption.  However, a client that
    requests resumption of a session does not know whether the server
    will have all of the context necessary to accept this request, and
    therefore the client SHOULD send an extended client hello message
    that includes the extension types associated with the authorization
    extensions.  This way, if the resumption request is denied, then the
    authorization extensions will be negotiated as normal.
 
    When a session is resumed, ClientHello is followed immediately by
    ChangeCipherSpec, which does not provide an opportunity for different
    authorization information can be exchanged.  Successful session
    resumption MUST use the same authorization information as the
    original session.
 
 2.1.  The client_authz Extension Type
 
    Clients MUST include the client_authz extension type in the extended
    client hello message to indicate their desire to send authorization
    data to the server.  The extension_data field indicates the format of
    the authorization data that will be sent in the supplemental data
    handshake message.  The syntax of the client_authz extension_data
    field is described in Section 2.3.
 
    Servers that receive an extended client hello message containing the
    client_authz extension MUST respond with the same client_authz
    extension in the extended server hello message if the server is
    willing to receive authorization data in the indicated format.  Any
    unacceptable formats must be removed from the list provided by the
    client.  The client_authz extension MUST be omitted from the extended
    server hello message if the server is not willing to receive
    authorization data in any of the indicated formats.
 
 2.2.  The server_authz Extension Type
 
    Clients MUST include the server_authz extension type in the extended
    client hello message to indicate their desire to receive
    authorization data from the server.  The extension_data field
    indicates the format of the authorization data that will be sent in
    the supplemental data handshake message.  The syntax of the
    server_authz extension_data field is described in Section 2.3.
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    Servers that receive an extended client hello message containing the
    server_authz extension MUST respond with the same server_authz
    extension in the extended server hello message if the server is
    willing to provide authorization data in the requested format.  Any
    unacceptable formats must be removed from the list provided by the
    client.  The server_authz extension MUST be omitted from the extended
    server hello message if the server is not able to provide
    authorization data in any of the indicated formats.
 
 2.3.  AuthzDataFormat Type
 
    The AuthzDataFormat type is used in both the client_authz and the
    server_authz extensions.  It indicates the format of the
    authorization data that will be transferred.  The AuthzDataFormats
    type definition is:
 
       enum {
          x509_attr_cert(0), saml_assertion(1), x509_attr_cert_url(2),
          saml_assertion_url(3), (255)
       } AuthzDataFormat;
 
       AuthzDataFormats authz_format_list<1..2^8-1>;
 
    When the x509_attr_cert value is present, the authorization data is
    an X.509 attribute certificate (AC) that conforms to the profile in
    RFC 5755 [ATTRCERT].
 
    When the saml_assertion value is present, the authorization data is
    an assertion composed using the Security Assertion Markup Language
    (SAML) ([SAML1.1], [SAML2.0]).
 
    When the x509_attr_cert_url value is present, the authorization data
    is an X.509 AC that conforms to the profile in RFC 5755 [ATTRCERT];
    however, the AC is fetched with the supplied URL.  A one-way hash
    value is provided to ensure that the intended AC is obtained.
 
    When the saml_assertion_url value is present, the authorization data
    is a SAML assertion; however, the SAML assertion is fetched with the
    supplied URL.  A one-way hash value is provided to ensure that the
    intended SAML assertion is obtained.
 
    Implementations that support either x509_attr_cert_url or
    saml_assertion_url MUST support URLs that employ the http scheme
    [HTTP].  These implementations MUST confirm that the hash value
    computed on the fetched authorization matches the one received in the
    handshake.  Mismatch of the hash values SHOULD be treated as though
    the authorization was not provided, which will result in a
    bad_certificate_hash_value alert (see Section 4).  Implementations
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    MUST deny access if the authorization cannot be obtained from the
    provided URL, by sending a certificate_unobtainable alert (see
    Section 4).
 
 3.  Supplemental Data Handshake Message Usage
 
    As shown in Figure 1, supplemental data can be exchanged in two
    places in the handshake protocol.  The client_authz extension
    determines what authorization data formats are acceptable for
    transfer from the client to the server, and the server_authz
    extension determines what authorization data formats are acceptable
    for transfer from the server to the client.  In both cases, the
    syntax specified in [TLSSUPP] is used along with the authz_data type
    defined in this document.
 
       enum {
          authz_data(16386), (65535)
       } SupplementalDataType;
 
       struct {
          SupplementalDataType supplemental_data_type;
          select(SupplementalDataType) {
             case authz_data:  AuthorizationData;
          }
       } SupplementalData;
 
 3.1.  Client Authorization Data
 
    The SupplementalData message sent from the client to the server
    contains authorization data associated with the TLS client.
    Following the principle of least privilege, the client ought to send
    the minimal set of authorization information necessary to accomplish
    the task at hand.  That is, only those authorizations that are
    expected to be required by the server in order to gain access to the
    needed server resources ought to be included.  The format of the
    authorization data depends on the format negotiated in the
    client_authz hello message extension.  The AuthorizationData
    structure is described in Section 3.3.
 
    In some systems, clients present authorization information to the
    server, and then the server provides new authorization information.
    This type of transaction is not supported by SupplementalData
    messages.  In cases where the client intends to request the TLS
    server to perform authorization translation or expansion services,
    such translation services ought to occur within the ApplicationData
    messages, and not within the TLS Handshake Protocol.
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 3.2.  Server Authorization Data
 
    The SupplementalData message sent from the server to the client
    contains authorization data associated with the TLS server.  This
    authorization information is expected to include statements about the
    server’s qualifications, reputation, accreditation, and so on.
    Wherever possible, authorizations that can be misappropriated for
    fraudulent use ought to be avoided.  The format of the authorization
    data depends on the format negotiated in the server_authz hello
    message extensions.  The AuthorizationData structure is described in
    Section 3.3, and the following fictitious example of a single 5-octet
    SAML assertion illustrates its use:
 
       17             # Handshake.msg_type == supplemental_data(23)
       00 00 11       # Handshake.length = 17
       00 00 0e       # length of SupplementalData.supp_data = 14
       40 02          # SupplementalDataEntry.supp_data_type = 16386
       00 0a          # SupplementalDataEntry.supp_data_length = 10
       00 08          # length of AuthorizationData.authz_data_list = 8
       01             # authz_format = saml_assertion(1)
       00 05          # length of SAMLAssertion
       aa aa aa aa aa # SAML assertion (fictitious: "aa aa aa aa aa")
 
 3.3.  AuthorizationData Type
 
    The AuthorizationData structure carries authorization information for
    either the client or the server.  The AuthzDataFormat specified in
    Section 2.3 for use in the hello extensions is also used in this
    structure.
 
    All of the entries in the authz_data_list MUST employ authorization
    data formats that were negotiated in the relevant hello message
    extension.
 
    The HashAlgorithm type is taken from [TLS1.2], which allows
    additional one-way hash functions to be registered in the IANA TLS
    HashAlgorithm registry in the future.
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       struct{
          AuthorizationDataEntry authz_data_list<1..2^16-1>;
       } AuthorizationData;
 
       struct {
          AuthzDataFormat authz_format;
          select (AuthzDataFormat) {
             case x509_attr_cert:         X509AttrCert;
             case saml_assertion:         SAMLAssertion;
             case x509_attr_cert_url:     URLandHash;
             case saml_assertion_url:     URLandHash;
          }
       } AuthorizationDataEntry;
 
       enum {
          x509_attr_cert(0), saml_assertion(1), x509_attr_cert_url(2),
          saml_assertion_url(3), (255)
       } AuthzDataFormat;
 
       opaque X509AttrCert<1..2^16-1>;
 
       opaque SAMLAssertion<1..2^16-1>;
 
       struct {
          opaque url<1..2^16-1>;
          HashAlgorithm hash_alg;
          select (hash_alg) {
             case md5:    MD5Hash;
             case sha1:   SHA1Hash;
             case sha224: SHA224Hash;
             case sha256: SHA256Hash;
             case sha384: SHA384Hash;
             case sha512: SHA512Hash;
          } hash;
       } URLandHash;
 
       enum {
          none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
          sha512(6), (255)
       } HashAlgorithm;
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       opaque MD5Hash[16];
 
       opaque SHA1Hash[20];
 
       opaque SHA224Hash[28];
 
       opaque SHA256Hash[32];
 
       opaque SHA384Hash[48];
 
       opaque SHA512Hash[64];
 
 3.3.1.  X.509 Attribute Certificate
 
    When X509AttrCert is used, the field contains an ASN.1 Distinguished
    Encoding Rules (DER)-encoded X.509 attribute certificate (AC) that
    follows the profile in RFC 5755 [ATTRCERT].  An AC is a structure
    similar to a public key certificate (PKC) [PKIX1]; the main
    difference is that the AC contains no public key.  An AC may contain
    attributes that specify group membership, role, security clearance,
    or other authorization information associated with the AC holder.
 
    When making an authorization decision based on an AC, proper linkage
    between the AC holder and the public key certificate that is
    transferred in the TLS Certificate message is needed.  The AC holder
    field provides this linkage.  The holder field is a SEQUENCE allowing
    three different (optional) syntaxes: baseCertificateID, entityName,
    and objectDigestInfo.  In the TLS authorization context, the holder
    field MUST use either the baseCertificateID or entityName.  In the
    baseCertificateID case, the baseCertificateID field MUST match the
    issuer and serialNumber fields in the certificate.  In the entityName
    case, the entityName MUST be the same as the subject field in the
    certificate or one of the subjectAltName extension values in the
    certificate.  Note that [PKIX1] mandates that the subjectAltName
    extension be present if the subject field contains an empty
    distinguished name.
 
 3.3.2.  SAML Assertion
 
    When SAMLAssertion is used, the field MUST contain well-formed XML
    [XML1.0] and MUST use either UTF-8 [UTF-8] or UTF-16 [UTF-16]
    character encoding.  UTF-8 is the preferred character encoding.  The
    XML text declaration MUST be followed by an <Assertion> element using
    the AssertionType complex type as defined in [SAML1.1] and [SAML2.0].
    The XML text MUST also follow the rules of [XML1.0] for including the
    Byte Order Mark (BOM) in encoded entities.  SAML is an XML-based
    framework for exchanging security information.  This security
    information is expressed in the form of assertions about subjects,
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    where a subject is either human or computer with an identity.  In
    this context, the SAML assertions are most likely to convey
    authentication or attribute statements to be used as input to
    authorization policy governing whether subjects are allowed to access
    certain resources.  Assertions are issued by SAML authorities.
 
    When making an authorization decision based on a SAML assertion,
    proper linkage between the SAML assertion and the public key
    certificate that is transferred in the TLS Certificate message may be
    needed.  A "Holder of Key" subject confirmation method in the SAML
    assertion can provide this linkage.  In other scenarios, it may be
    acceptable to use alternate confirmation methods that do not provide
    a strong binding, such as a bearer mechanism.  SAML assertion
    recipients MUST decide which subject confirmation methods are
    acceptable; such decisions MAY be specific to the SAML assertion
    contents and the TLS session context.
 
    There is no general requirement that the subject of the SAML
    assertion correspond directly to the subject of the certificate.
    They may represent the same or different entities.  When they are
    different, SAML also provides a mechanism by which the certificate
    subject can be identified separately from the subject in the SAML
    assertion subject confirmation method.
 
    Since the SAML assertion is being provided at a part of the TLS
    handshake that is unencrypted, an eavesdropper could replay the same
    SAML assertion when they establish their own TLS session.  This is
    especially important when a bearer mechanism is employed; the
    recipient of the SAML assertion assumes that the sender is an
    acceptable attesting entity for the SAML assertion.  Some constraints
    may be included to limit the context where the bearer mechanism will
    be accepted.  For example, the period of time that the SAML assertion
    can be short-lived (often minutes), the source address can be
    constrained, or the destination endpoint can be identified.  Also,
    bearer assertions are often checked against a cache of SAML assertion
    unique identifiers that were recently received, in order to detect
    replay.  This is an appropriate countermeasure if the bearer
    assertion is intended to be used just once.  Section 6 provides a way
    to protect authorization information when necessary.
 
 3.3.3.  URL and Hash
 
    Since the X.509 AC and SAML assertion can be large, alternatives
    provide a URL to obtain the ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 AC or SAML
    assertion.  To ensure that the intended object is obtained, a one-way
    hash value of the object is also included.  Integrity of this one-way
    hash value is provided by the TLS Finished message.
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    Implementations that support either x509_attr_cert_url or
    saml_assertion_url MUST support URLs that employ the HTTP scheme.
    Other schemes may also be supported.  When dereferencing these URLs,
    circular dependencies MUST be avoided.  Avoiding TLS when
    dereferencing these URLs is one way to avoid circular dependencies.
    Therefore, clients using the HTTP scheme MUST NOT use these TLS
    extensions if UPGRADE in HTTP [UPGRADE] is used.  For other schemes,
    similar care must be taken to avoid using these TLS extensions.
 
    Implementations that support either x509_attr_cert_url or
    saml_assertion_url MUST support both SHA-1 [SHS] and SHA-256 [SHS] as
    one-way hash functions.  Other one-way hash functions may also be
    supported.  Additional one-way hash functions can be added to the
    IANA TLS HashAlgorithm registry in the future.
 
    Implementations that support x509_attr_cert_url MUST support
    responses that employ the "application/pkix-attr-cert" Multipurpose
    Internet Mail Extension (MIME) media type as defined in [ACTYPE].
 
    Implementations that support saml_assertion_url MUST support
    responses that employ the "application/samlassertion+xml" MIME type
    as defined in Appendix A of [SAMLBIND].
 
    TLS authorizations SHOULD follow the additional guidance provided in
    Section 3.3 of [TLSEXT2] regarding client certificate URLs.
 
 4.  Alert Messages
 
    This document specifies the reuse of TLS Alert messages related to
    public key certificate processing for any errors that arise during
    authorization processing, while preserving the AlertLevels as
    authoritatively defined in [TLS1.2] or [TLSEXT2].  All alerts used in
    authorization processing are fatal.
 
    The following updated definitions for the Alert messages are used to
    describe errors that arise while processing authorizations.  For ease
    of comparison, we reproduce the Alert message definition from
    Section 7.2 of [TLS1.2], augmented with two values defined in
    [TLSEXT2]:
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       enum { warning(1), fatal(2), (255) } AlertLevel;
 
       enum {
           close_notify(0),
           unexpected_message(10),
           bad_record_mac(20),
           decryption_failed_RESERVED(21),
           record_overflow(22),
           decompression_failure(30),
           handshake_failure(40),
           no_certificate_RESERVED(41),
           bad_certificate(42),
           unsupported_certificate(43),
           certificate_revoked(44),
           certificate_expired(45),
           certificate_unknown(46),
           illegal_parameter(47),
           unknown_ca(48),
           access_denied(49),
           decode_error(50),
           decrypt_error(51),
           export_restriction_RESERVED(60),
           protocol_version(70),
           insufficient_security(71),
           internal_error(80),
           user_canceled(90),
           no_renegotiation(100),
           unsupported_extension(110),
           certificate_unobtainable(111),
           bad_certificate_hash_value(114),
           (255)
       } AlertDescription;
 
       struct {
           AlertLevel level;
           AlertDescription description;
       } Alert;
 
    TLS processing of alerts includes some ambiguity because the message
    does not indicate which certificate in a certification path gave rise
    to the error.  This problem is made slightly worse in this extended
    use of alerts, as the alert could be the result of an error in
    processing of either a certificate or an authorization.
    Implementations that support these extensions should be aware of this
    imprecision.
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    The AlertDescription values are used as follows to report errors in
    authorizations processing:
 
       bad_certificate
          In certificate processing, bad_certificate indicates that a
          certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not
          verify correctly, and so on.  Similarly, in authorization
          processing, bad_certificate indicates that an authorization was
          corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly,
          and so on.  In authorization processing, bad_certificate can
          also indicate that the handshake established that an
          AuthzDataFormat was to be provided, but no AuthorizationData of
          the expected format was provided in SupplementalData.
 
       unsupported_certificate
          In certificate processing, unsupported_certificate indicates
          that a certificate was of an unsupported type.  Similarly, in
          authorization processing, unsupported_certificate indicates
          that AuthorizationData uses a version or format unsupported by
          the implementation.
 
       certificate_revoked
          In certificate processing, certificate_revoked indicates that a
          certificate was revoked by its issuer.  Similarly, in
          authorization processing, certificate_revoked indicates that
          authorization was revoked by its issuer, or a certificate that
          was needed to validate the signature on the authorization was
          revoked by its issuer.
 
       certificate_expired
          In certificate processing, certificate_expired indicates that a
          certificate has expired or is not currently valid.  Similarly,
          in authorization processing, certificate_expired indicates that
          an authorization has expired or is not currently valid.
 
       certificate_unknown
          In certificate processing, certificate_unknown indicates that
          some other (unspecified) issue arose while processing the
          certificate, rendering it unacceptable.  Similarly, in
          authorization processing, certificate_unknown indicates that
          processing of AuthorizationData failed because of other
          (unspecified) issues, including AuthzDataFormat parse errors.
 
       unknown_ca
          In certificate processing, unknown_ca indicates that a valid
          certification path or partial certification path was received,
          but the certificate was not accepted because the certification
          authority (CA) certificate could not be located or could not be
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          matched with a known, trusted CA.  Similarly, in authorization
          processing, unknown_ca indicates that the authorization issuer
          is not known and trusted.
 
       access_denied
          In certificate processing, access_denied indicates that a valid
          certificate was received, but when access control was applied,
          the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.  Similarly,
          in authorization processing, access_denied indicates that the
          authorization was not sufficient to grant access.
 
       certificate_unobtainable
          The client_certificate_url extension defined in RFC 4366
          [TLSEXT2] specifies that download errors lead to a
          certificate_unobtainable alert.  Similarly, in authorization
          processing, certificate_unobtainable indicates that a URL does
          not result in an authorization.  While certificate processing
          does not require this alert to be fatal, this is a fatal alert
          in authorization processing.
 
       bad_certificate_hash_value
          In certificate processing, bad_certificate_hash_value indicates
          that a downloaded certificate does not match the expected hash.
          Similarly, in authorization processing,
          bad_certificate_hash_value indicates that a downloaded
          authorization does not match the expected hash.
 
 5.  IANA Considerations
 
    This document defines two TLS extensions: client_authz(7) and
    server_authz(8).  These extension type values are assigned from the
    TLS Extension Type registry defined in [TLSEXT2].
 
    This document defines one TLS supplemental data type:
    authz_data(16386).  This supplemental data type is assigned from the
    TLS Supplemental Data Type registry defined in [TLSSUPP].
 
    This document establishes a new registry, to be maintained by IANA,
    for TLS Authorization Data Formats.  The first four entries in the
    registry are x509_attr_cert(0), saml_assertion(1),
    x509_attr_cert_url(2), and saml_assertion_url(3).  TLS Authorization
    Data Format identifiers with values in the inclusive range 0-63
    (decimal) are assigned via RFC 5226 [IANA] IETF Review.  Values from
    the inclusive range 64-223 (decimal) are assigned via RFC 5226
    Specification Required.  Values from the inclusive range 224-255
    (decimal) are reserved for RFC 5226 Private Use.
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 6.  Security Considerations
 
    A TLS server can support more than one application, and each
    application may include several features, each of which requires
    separate authorization checks.  This is the reason that more than one
    piece of authorization information can be provided.
 
    A TLS server that requires different authorization information for
    different applications or different application features may find
    that a client has provided sufficient authorization information to
    grant access to a subset of these offerings.  In this situation, the
    TLS Handshake Protocol will complete successfully; however, the
    server must ensure that the client will only be able to use the
    appropriate applications and application features.  That is, the TLS
    server must deny access to the applications and application features
    for which authorization has not been confirmed.
 
    In cases where the authorization information itself is sensitive, the
    double handshake technique can be used to provide protection for the
    authorization information.  Figure 2 illustrates the double
    handshake, where the initial handshake does not include any
    authorization extensions, but it does result in protected
    communications.  Then, a second handshake that includes the
    authorization information is performed using the protected
    communications.  In Figure 2, the number on the right side indicates
    the amount of protection for the TLS message on that line.  A zero
    (0) indicates that there is no communication protection; a one (1)
    indicates that protection is provided by the first TLS session; and a
    two (2) indicates that protection is provided by both TLS sessions.
 
    The placement of the SupplementalData message in the TLS handshake
    results in the server providing its authorization information before
    the client is authenticated.  In many situations, servers will not
    want to provide authorization information until the client is
    authenticated.  The double handshake illustrated in Figure 2 provides
    a technique to ensure that the parties are mutually authenticated
    before either party provides authorization information.
 
    The use of bearer SAML assertions allows an eavesdropper or a man-in-
    the-middle to capture the SAML assertion and try to reuse it in
    another context.  The constraints discussed in Section 3.3.2 might be
    effective against an eavesdropper, but they are less likely to be
    effective against a man-in-the-middle.  Authentication of both
    parties in the TLS session, which involves the use of client
    authentication, will prevent an undetected man-in-the-middle, and the
    use of the double handshake illustrated in Figure 2 will prevent the
    disclosure of the bearer SAML assertion to any party other than the
    TLS peer.
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    AuthzDataFormats that point to authorization data, such as
    x509_attr_cert_url and saml_assertion_url, rather than simply
    including the authorization data in the handshake, may be exploited
    by an attacker.  Implementations that accept pointers to
    authorization data SHOULD adopt a policy of least privilege that
    limits the acceptable references that they will attempt to use.  For
    more information, see Section 6.3 of [TLSEXT2].
 
     Client                                                   Server
 
     ClientHello (no extensions) -------->                            |0
                                         ServerHello (no extensions)  |0
                                                        Certificate*  |0
                                                  ServerKeyExchange*  |0
                                                 CertificateRequest*  |0
                                 <--------           ServerHelloDone  |0
     Certificate*                                                     |0
     ClientKeyExchange                                                |0
     CertificateVerify*                                               |0
     [ChangeCipherSpec]                                               |0
     Finished                    -------->                            |1
                                                  [ChangeCipherSpec]  |0
                                 <--------                  Finished  |1
     ClientHello (w/ extensions) -------->                            |1
                                         ServerHello (w/ extensions)  |1
                                   SupplementalData (w/ authz data)*  |1
                                                        Certificate*  |1
                                                  ServerKeyExchange*  |1
                                                 CertificateRequest*  |1
                                 <--------           ServerHelloDone  |1
     SupplementalData (w/ authz data)*                                |1
     Certificate*                                                     |1
     ClientKeyExchange                                                |1
     CertificateVerify*                                               |1
     [ChangeCipherSpec]                                               |1
     Finished                    -------->                            |2
                                                  [ChangeCipherSpec]  |1
                                 <--------                  Finished  |2
     Application Data            <------->          Application Data  |2
 
          Figure 2.  Double Handshake To Protect Authorization Data
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